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1 
 Defendants Michael Lacey and James Larkin (collectively, “Movants”), by and through 
undersigned counsel, hereby move the Court to grant a stay in this case, which is required to 
protect Messrs. Lacey’s and Larkin’s constitutional rights against self-incrimination.1  Indict-
ments have issued and federal criminal proceedings are ongoing against Lacey and Larkin in 
connection with the classified ad website Backpage.com, and the alleged appearance of ads on 
Backpage.com, involving Plaintiffs Jane Doe No. 1, Jane Doe No. 2, and Jane Doe No. 3, is the 
central basis for claims here against Movants (and the Backpage Defendants).  As grounds for 
their Motion, Messrs. Lacey and Larkin state as follows: 
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
 First and foremost, Movants deny each and every allegation of Plaintiffs’ First Amended 
Complaint that could serve as a basis for liability against them in this case.  Movants also deny 
the claims in the indictment, and in the related pleas entered by certain Backpage Defendants, 
and further contend they have done nothing wrong, either civilly or criminally.  Nonetheless, 
proceedings in this case must be stayed during the pendency of federal criminal proceedings in 
United States v. Lacey, et al., No. CR-18-00422-PHY-SPL (D. Ariz.) (“U.S. v. Lacey”), to 
protect Lacey’s and Larkin’s rights against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and article 12 of Massachusetts’ Declaration of Rights.2 
                                                 
1   Undersigned counsel initially represented all defendants in this case, including Carl Ferrer 
and Backpage.com, LLC (with Ferrer and Backpage.com, LLC referred to herein as the “Back-
page Defendants”), along with Lacey and Larkin.  Counsel filed a motion to withdraw as to the 
Backpage Defendants on May 4, 2018 (ECF No. 71), which the Court granted on June 29, 2018 
(ECF No. 81).  Undersigned counsel conferred pursuant to Local R. 7.1(a)(2) with counsel for 
Plaintiffs, who indicated they oppose this Motion.  No counsel has entered an appearance for the 
Backpage Defendants with whom to confer. 
2   U.S. Const. amend. V; Mass. Decl. of Rights art. 12.  Courts in Massachusetts have held 
Article 12’s privilege against self-incrimination is broader than that under the Fifth Amendment.  
E.g., Commonwealth v. Brewer, 34 N.E.2d 314, 317 n.8 (Mass. 2015).  References herein to the 
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“The Fifth Amendment declares in part that ‘No person * * * shall be compelled in any 
Criminal Case to be a witness against himself,’” Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 485-86 
(1951), and rests on “conviction that too high a price may be paid even for the unhampered 
enforcement of the criminal law and that, in its attainment, other social objects of a free society 
should not be sacrificed.”  Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487, 489 (1944).  This privilege 
against self-incrimination must be liberally construed “in favor of the right it was intended to 
secure.”  Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486.  As the Supreme Court has noted: 
[T]he most important [exception to an individual’s testimonial duty] is the 
Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination.  The 
privilege … marks an important advance in the development of our liberty.  It 
can be asserted in any proceeding, civil or criminal, administrative or judicial, 
investigatory or adjudicatory; and it protects against any disclosures which the 
witness reasonably believes could be used in a criminal prosecution or could 
lead to other evidence that might be so used. 
Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444-45 (1972) (footnoted citations omitted).  For that 
reason, the Court “has been zealous to safeguard the values which underlie the privilege.”  Id. at 
445.  A stay must be entered here because, given the overlap between U.S. v. Lacey, et al., and 
the present action, the “balancing [of] interests in this matter” warrants a stay.  United Techs. 
Corp., Hamilton Std. Div. v. Dean, 906 F. Supp. 27, 29 (D. Mass. 1995). 
 The First Amended Complaint in this case (ECF No. 64) (“FAC”) alleges that three 
young women—identified as Jane Doe No. 1, Jane Doe No. 2, and Jane Doe No. 3—were 
trafficked by unnamed third parties who used advertising on Backpage.com, leading to Plaintiffs’ 
victimization by other unnamed third-parties who responded to the ads.  Id. ¶¶ 78-110.3  The 
                                                                                                                                                             
right against self-incrimination are intended to encompass both the federal and state rights, and 
that is equally true to the extent they may be shorthanded here as “Fifth Amendment rights.” 
3   Previously, before the complaint was amended, the Court’s Order on Defendants’ Motion 
to Dismiss permitted limited “discovery focused on the changes, if any, made by Defendants or 
their agents in … posting ad[s] describing or referring to Jane Doe No. 3.”  Order on Motion to 
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claims against the Movants here (and the Backpage Defendants), for violation of the federal 
Trafficking Victims Protection Act under 18 U.S.C. § 1595, and unfair and deceptive practices 
under Mass. Gen. Laws c. 93A § 2 (a), rest entirely on Backpage.com allegedly hosting ads of 
Jane Doe No. 1, Jane Doe No. 2, and Jane Doe No. 3, the processing of the ads—if any—at the 
website, and related conduct.  The claims rely on a tacit assertion (setting aside its implausible 
premise) that if not for this activity at Backpage.com, Plaintiffs would not have been harmed.  
Cf. FAC ¶¶ 5, 117, 121 (averring that Jane Doe No. 1, Jane Doe No. 2, and Jane Doe No. 3 were 
harmed “as a result” of Backpage.com’s conduct).  This in turn relies on allegations about 
Backpage.com’s general editorial practices, including those in a staff report of the Senate 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Backpage.com’s Knowing Facilitation of Online Sex 
Trafficking (“PSI Report”). 
On April 9, 2018, the United States Department of Justice unsealed an indictment in U.S. 
v. Lacey, a copy of which is attached as Appendix A, asserting the same themes and theories that 
Plaintiffs allege here.  The indictment names various individuals involved with Backpage.com, 
as well as Lacey and Larkin as the website’s former owners.4  Like Plaintiffs’ claims here, the 
                                                                                                                                                             
Dismiss, Dkt. 44, at 2.  The Court later confirmed the original complaint was “devoid of factual 
allegations plausibly supporting the contention that Backpage created content … as to either of” 
Jane Doe No. 1 or Jane Doe No. 2 so their claims would be dismissed, but the limited discovery 
“reveal[ed] one ad advertising Jane Doe No. 3 which was changed” so, “drawing all reasonable 
inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, a modicum of support for the notion that Backpage [] substan-
tively changed an ad” existed.  Order on Motion to Dismiss, Dkt. 54, at 3-5.  The First Amended 
Complaint revises the allegations pertaining to Jane Doe No. 1 and Jane Doe No. 2 to include 
“information and belief” allegations tracking those made for Jane Doe No. 3 that survived the 
motion to dismiss.  
4   App. A ¶ 2.  The indictment also names Scott Spear and John Brunst, both minority 
owners and officers of the former parent company of Backpage.com; Andrew Padilla, formerly 
Operations Manager for Backpage.com; Joye Vaught, formerly Assistant Operations Manager 
for Backpage.com; and Dan Hyer, formerly Sales and Marketing Director for Backpage.com.  Id. 
¶¶ 3-7. 
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indictment relies on the PSI Report for its conclusions regarding alleged “practice[s] of altering 
ads before publication by deleting words, phrases, and images … to sanitize the [ads’] content.”  
Id. ¶ 113.  The indictment charges conspiracy and multiple counts under the Travel Act, 
18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3)(A) and (b)(i)(1), and federal money laundering statutes, 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 1956(a), 1956(h), and 1957(a).  In connection with the indictment, the government on 
April 12, 2018, unsealed a plea agreement, attached as Appendix B, with Backpage.com CEO 
Carl Ferrer, a co-defendant here,5 in which Ferrer agreed (among other things) to plead guilty to 
one violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 and shut down Backpage.com and forfeit it to the government, 
in exchange for a maximum prison term of no more than five years.  See App. B § 2.a.   
Viewing the federal U.S. v. Lacey criminal case alongside Plaintiffs’ claims, Movants 
satisfy the criteria applied in this jurisdiction for staying contemporaneous civil cases, in order to 
protect Lacey’s and Larkin’s constitutional rights against self-incrimination.  Plaintiffs allege 
claims and liability against Messrs. Larkin and Lacey because of accusations about publication 
of ads at Backpage.com, based on the same (misplaced) theories of liability that the government 
advances in U.S. v. Lacey.  Movants cannot answer or defend the civil claims without risking 
self-incrimination in the pending criminal matter, or having their invocation of their Fifth 
Amendment rights here, to avoid such self-incrimination, create adverse inferences that 
undermine their defense in this case.  See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Gov’t Emps. v. Mulligan, 849 
F. Supp. 2d 167, 173 (D. Mass. 2012) (“NAGE”) (“Parallel criminal and civil proceedings would 
present the defendants with a conundrum:  invoke their Fifth Amendment rights and risk losing 
the civil action or answer discovery requests in the civil action and risk criminal [conviction].”). 
                                                 
5   Backpage.com, LLC, also a co-defendant here, entered a similar plea agreement, attached 
as Appendix C, focused on money laundering.  These federal plea agreements also required 
pleading guilty to California money laundering charges and similar charges in Texas.  See App. 
B at 3-4; App. C at 2-3. 
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“A stay can protect a civil defendant from facing the difficult choice between being 
prejudiced in the civil litigation, if the defendant asserts his or her Fifth Amendment privilege, or 
from being prejudiced in the criminal litigation if he or she waives that privilege in the civil 
litigation.”  Green v. Cosby, 177 F. Supp. 3d 673, 680 (D. Mass. 2016) (quoting Louis Vuitton 
Malletier S.A. v. LY USA, Inc., 676 F.3d 83, 97 (2d Cir. 2012)).  ”[D]uring the pendency of a 
parallel criminal investigation or prosecution, such a scenario has been recognized as one in 
which a stay may be appropriate.”  Zavatsky v. O’Brien, 902 F. Supp. 2d 135, 147 (D. Mass. 
2012).  In this respect, the “most pressing consideration” in determining whether to grant a stay 
“is [the] Defendant’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.”  Id. at 679.  Given 
such consequences, each of the factors articulated by the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, 
as discussed below, weigh in favor of protecting Lacey’s and Larkin’s constitutional rights 
against self-incrimination, and thus warrant a stay. 
ARGUMENT 
 “It is axiomatic that ‘federal courts possess the inherent power to stay proceedings for 
prudential reasons.’”  Green, 177 F. Supp. 3d at 678 (quoting Microfinancial, Inc. v. Premier 
Holidays Int’l, Inc., 385 F.3d 72, 77 (1st Cir. 2004)).  Where a civil case raises the same or 
similar issues as are present in a parallel criminal proceeding, as here, a stay is necessary “not 
only [to] protect[] the individual against being involuntarily called as a witness against himself in 
a criminal proceeding,” but also to protect against being compelled “to answer official questions 
put to him in any other proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the answers 
might incriminate him in future criminal proceedings.”  Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 
(1973) (emphases added).  “When a defendant is facing criminal prosecution (in either state or 
federal court), this court will frequently stay any related federal proceedings pending resolution 
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of the underlying criminal charges.”  United States v. Moscaritolo, 2010 WL 3303639, at *1 (D. 
Mass. Aug. 20, 2010).  As the First Circuit has explained, 
although the Constitution couches [the Fifth Amendment] privilege in terms of 
criminal cases, it is now beyond question that the right of a witness not to give 
incriminating answers applies with equal force to any proceeding, be it criminal 
or civil, administrative or judicial, investigatory or adjudicatory, whenever the 
answer to a question put to a witness might subject him to criminal responsibility. 
 
In re Kave, 760 F.2d 343, 353-54 (1st Cir. 1985). 
 To warrant a stay, the First Circuit has identified seven factors that must be considered: 
1) the interests of the civil plaintiff in proceeding expeditiously with the civil 
litigation, 2) the hardship to the defendant, including the burden placed upon him 
should the cases go forward in tandem, 3) the convenience of both the civil and 
criminal courts, 4) the interests of third parties, 5) the public interest, 6) the good 
faith of the litigants (or the absence of it) and 7) the status of the cases. 
 
NAGE, 849 F. Supp. 2d at 173 (citing Microfinancial, 385 F.3d at 78).  The court also must 
consider “the extent to which the issues in the criminal case overlap with those presented in the 
civil case.”  SEC v. TelexFree, Inc., 52 F. Supp. 3d 349, 352 (D. Mass. 2014).  Because these 
factors weigh in favor of Movants, the Court should stay all deadlines in this civil proceeding 
pending resolution of the criminal charges against Lacey and Larkin. 
I. THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL OVERLAP BETWEEN U.S. V. LACEY AND THIS 
CIVIL ACTION. 
The overlap between the claims in this case and Plaintiffs’ theory of liability, and the 
charges to be litigated in U.S. v. Lacey is obvious.  Courts in this jurisdiction have recognized 
that this degree of overlap is often the most important factor to consider in determining whether a 
case should be stayed.  See Green, 177 F. Supp. 3d at 678; TelexFree, 52 F. Supp. 3d at 352; 
United Techs., 906 F. Supp. at 29; cf. SEC v. K2 Unlimited, Inc., 15 F. Supp. 3d 158, 161 (D. 
Mass. 2014) (declining to stay a case where the “allegations at the heart of the criminal 
indictment [were] … not encompassed by the claims for relief in the civil complaint”).  Here, 
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both the indictment in U.S. v. Lacey and Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint rely heavily on 
“the same alleged conduct” of generalized allegations about Backpage.com’s maintaining an 
“adult” category, about defendants’ asserted awareness of types of ads users posted to the site, 
and about filtering and moderation practices the website employed. 
Plaintiffs seek to impose liability on the asserted grounds that Backpage.com “edit[ed] 
ads for explicit sexual language,” and prohibited terms that suggested ads involved minors, while 
“knowing” the website was misused for such purposes.  FAC ¶ 37.  Plaintiffs further allege this 
“taught traffickers the terms and phrases” to avoid, id. ¶ 57, insofar as Backpage.com modified 
“advertisements through the automated and manual moderation processes.”  Id. ¶¶ 52-53.  In this 
way, Plaintiffs allege, Backpage.com “knowingly benefitted financially from participation in” its 
users’ illegal conduct.  Id. ¶¶ 113, 115-16.  Further, both the First Amended Complaint and the 
PSI Report on which it relies allege the structure and operation of Backpage.com supposedly 
“facilitated” the illegal activities, that its operators profited from them, and that editing processes 
“contributed” to those outcomes.  Id. ¶¶ 5, 53, 113, 115-16. 
The government’s indictment charging Lacey, Larkin, and others in connection with 
content at Backpage.com cites the same editorial functions at website as do Plaintiffs here.  It 
bases counts of facilitating prostitution on, among other things, the use of “computerized filters 
and human ‘moderators’ [that] edit … (or block) ads.”  App. A ¶ 9.  The government also alleges 
defendants were “aware” of the misuse of the site by users, id. ¶ 31, and “sought to sanitize [ads] 
by editing.”  Id. ¶ 32.  See also id. ¶ 113 (citing the alleged “Backpage … practice of altering 
ads … by deleting words, phrases, and images”).6 
                                                 
6   The indictment also makes much of Backpage.com’s use of lists of words or phrases that 
the website filtered from ads in which they appeared, id. ¶ 61, and the asserted extent to which 
Backpage deleted pictures from ads as well.  Id. ¶ 65. 
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This comparison of claims in the civil and criminal cases illustrates the overlap that 
warrant a stay.  Plaintiffs and the government relied on similar theories, and their respective 
cases will implicate the same or similar evidence, witnesses, and other data.  TelexFree, 
52 F. Supp. 3d at 352.   It is not necessary that Plaintiffs here be the among the persons 
implicated in the criminal case, or that their specific ads be those charged in the indictment, but 
rather it is enough that the types of conduct alleged in both cases are similar.  See Green, 
177 F. Supp. 3d at 679-81 (finding significant overlap between criminal case and the civil claims 
even though the defendant was “not facing prosecution in Pennsylvania for the same conduct 
alleged by Plaintiffs”). The requirement for overlap between the civil and criminal cases 
necessary to support as stay is satisfied here.  
II. THE BALANCE OF INTERESTS SUPPORT A STAY. 
The balance of interests test outlined by the First Circuit also supports issuance of a stay.  
While “[b]alancing these interests is a situation-specific task” that requires “a careful look at the 
idiosyncratic circumstances of the case before it” taken as a whole, Microfinancial, 385 F.3d at 
78, they support a stay in this case. 
As to the first factor, the impact of potential delays on Plaintiffs, several points favor the 
Movants.  At the outset, Plaintiffs did not move with any particular urgency in bringing their 
case, originally filing on June 12, 2017 (ECF No. 1), to recover for harms dating to 2013.  FAC 
¶¶ 79, 87.  In addition, it can be noted, without minimizing the abuse Jane Doe No. 1, Jane Doe 
No. 2, and Jane Doe No. 3 suffered at the hands of their traffickers, that as a practical matter, the 
only remedy in this case is money damages, see id. passim, which generally is not a time-
sensitive matter.7  And in any event, “while a stay may cause some inconvenience and delay to 
                                                 
7   Plaintiffs include unspecified “injunctive relief” in their prayer, FAC p.38, but a year into 
the case have not sought a preliminary injunction, and in any case cannot allege irreparable harm 
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[Plaintiffs, the] ‘protection of defendant[s’] constitutional rights against self-incrimination is the 
more important consideration.’”  United Techs., 906 F. Supp. at 29 (quoting Corbin v. FDIC, 
74 F.R.D. 147, 149-50 (E.D.N.Y. 1977)); see also Zavatsky, 902 F. Supp. 2d at 148 (“[T]he 
plaintiff’s interest in expeditious resolution of his civil claim will always be delayed by the grant 
of a stay, but no more so here than in other cases.”).   
Second, as to hardship faced by Movants, because of the overlap between the criminal 
case and present litigation, see supra § 1, a stay “would avoid putting defendants in the position 
of choosing whether to invoke their Fifth Amendment rights and risk losing the civil action or to 
answer discovery requests in the civil action and risk criminal prosecution.”  Zavatsky, 902 F. 
Supp. 2d at 147-48.  Lacey and Larkin “have a much greater liberty interest at stake because they 
face prosecution.”  Id. at 148; cf. Microfinancial, 385 F.3d at 79 (declining to grant stay where 
defendants had not yet been indicted).  They have no choice but to invoke their Fifth Amend-
ment rights against self-incrimination, when questioned in discovery, and at trial because “[t]here 
is a risk that discovery in this matter will expose them to further criminal sanctions which weighs 
upon their ability to defend this action.”  Zavatsky, 902 F. Supp. 2d at 148.  Both Lacey and 
Larkin have been indicted, and the government’s criminal case against them is moving forward.  
The substantial overlap, as detailed above, weighs strongly in favor of a stay.  
In this case the parallel counts of the federal prosecution and this civil action allege 
knowledge and intent by the respective defendants.8  Refuting such claims, regardless of the 
                                                                                                                                                             
necessary for all injunctive relief, which is prospective only, see, e.g., Dirrane v. Brookline 
Police Dep’t, 315 F.3d 65, 71 (1st Cir. 2002), inasmuch as the United States has seized and shut 
down the Backpage.com website.  See App. B at 2-3. 
8   See, e.g., App. A ¶¶ 158, 163 (alleging “defendants … knowingly … agreed, confederated, 
and conspired with each other, and [] others …, to commit … offenses” including facilitating 
prostitution by publishing ads); FAC ¶ 5 (alleging defendants “intentionally facilitated the sale of 
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differing levels of scienter that may apply criminally and civilly, cannot be undertaken without 
implicating the right against self-incrimination.  Certainly any explanation of what Lacey and 
Larkin may or may not have done with regard to ad(s) involving the Jane Doe Plaintiffs could 
“furnish a link” in the chain of evidence as to conduct alleged in U.S. v. Lacey.  Discussion of 
Lacey’s and Larkin’s role (if any) in publishing and processing ad(s) on which this civil action is 
based implicates conduct charged in U.S. v. Lacey, because Lacey and Larkin will be unable to 
“mount a proper defense” without exposing themselves to risk of self-incrimination.  Not 
answering questions in discovery or being able to fully challenge Plaintiffs’ allegations, 
meanwhile, by invoking the constitutional right against self-incrimination, threatens prejudice 
against Lacey and Larkin because “an adverse inference may be drawn from the invocation of 
the privilege.”  Green, 177 F. Supp. 3d at 679 (citing Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318 
(1976)).  “On the other hand, a defendant who waives his Fifth Amendment privilege in the civil 
case faces the prospect of incriminating himself in the criminal case by disclosing evidence that 
may tend to support a conviction.”  Id.  In such circumstances, the Court must grant a stay of the 
civil action to safeguard the right against self-incrimination. 
Third, the convenience to both the civil and criminal courts also favors a stay.  Discovery 
on the complaint as amended has not begun,  and dispositive motions can still be filed.  Zavatsky, 
902 F. Supp. 2d at 148-49.  The Court has not yet set a trial date.  Cf. Microfinancial, 385 F.3d at 
79 (affirming a denial of stay requested “on the brink of trial”).  Given this posture, “[a] stay 
would [] conserve judicial resources and narrow the issues to be resolved in the event that 
criminal convictions are obtained,” which could “expedite resolution of the civil action once the 
stay is lifted.”  TelexFree, 52 F. Supp. 3d at 353.  During a stay neither the parties nor the Court 
                                                                                                                                                             
Plaintiffs … by, among other things, altering the content of []ad[s]”), ¶ 113 (alleging 
“Defendants knowingly benefitted financially”). 
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will be required to expend efforts or resources (until the case resumes), so judicial and litigation 
economy support a stay.  
The interests of third parties and the public, the fourth and fifth factors, also favor a stay.  
Movants are unaware of any third parties who would be prejudiced or otherwise affected by a 
stay of this case.  Nor is it clear any such interests would not be served by the ongoing criminal 
proceeding.  And as this Court has affirmatively held, the public’s interest “may be vindicated 
through the ongoing state civil and criminal proceedings.”  Zavatsky, 902 F. Supp. 2d at 149.  
While the public may have an interest “in the timely resolution of this proceeding … the public 
interest in unimpeded criminal law enforcement outweighs the civil interests here.”  TelexFree, 
52 F. Supp. 3d at 353.  In this case, the public interest is served by safeguarding Lacey’s and 
Larkin’s constitutional rights against self-incrimination, and not forcing them to choose between 
defending this action and being prejudiced in the U.S. v. Lacey federal prosecution.  See Press-
Enter. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 464 U.S. 501, 508 (1984) (“No right ranks higher than the 
right of the accused to a fair trial.”).  The public interest always favors protecting constitutional 
rights.  See, e.g., Reaves v. Department of Correction, 195 F. Supp. 3d 383, 426-27 (D. Mass. 
2016); Magriz v. Union de Tronquistas de P.R., Local 901, 765 F. Supp. 2d 143, 157 (D.P.R. 
2011). 
The sixth factor examining the good faith of the litigants also favors a stay.  Lacey and 
Larkin have acted in good faith throughout the pendency of this litigation, and Plaintiffs have not 
alleged otherwise.  While the indictment was filed under seal on March 28, 2018, Lacey and 
Larkin were not arrested until April 6, the indictment was not unsealed until April 9 (the next 
business day), and the Ferrer and Backpage.com, LLC plea agreements were not unsealed until 
April 12.  Counsel for Movants moved as quickly as possible to take each of the successive steps 
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necessitated by those developments, see ECF Nos. 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 79, 80, 81, 83 
(collectively, withdrawals of representation and pending motions, plaintiff responses, resultant 
court orders, a sealed showing on continued representation), and this Motion to Stay was pre-
pared and filed as the next step as expeditiously as possible. 
Finally, the status of the case also tilts in favor of a stay.  The fact that the Court has not 
issued a scheduling order, and that this case is still in its early phases, favor grant of a stay.  
Discovery has not commenced on the First Amended Complaint, but see note 3, supra, and no 
trial date has been set.  Meanwhile, it does not appear this case can go forward against defen-
dants other than Lacey and Larkin, as Plaintiff has requested a notice of default against Ferrer 
and Backpage.com, LLC (ECF No. 78), the only two other defendants.  For all these reasons, 
staying the case is in the interest of judicial economy and the Court. 
In sum, the balancing test set forth by the First Circuit weighs in favor of a stay, because 
Lacey’s and Larkin’s constitutional rights against self-incrimination outweigh any potential 
prejudice to Plaintiffs.  Movants have shown “that a stay would promote the interests of justice 
in this case.”  Mulligan, 849 F. Supp. 2d at 173.  Thus, entry of a stay is appropriate. 
CONCLUSION 
WHEREFORE, Defendants Lacey and Larkin respectfully submit that this Court should 
stay the present matter, because the overlap between this action and the pending criminal case in 
U.S. v. Lacey threatens Lacey’s and Larkin’s constitutional rights against self-incrimination, and 
because safeguarding those rights outweighs any potential prejudice to Plaintiffs.  Messrs. Lacey 
and Larkin should not be forced to choose between protecting their constitutional rights or parti-
cipating fully in defense of this civil case.  Even if a stay of the case is not granted in full, the 
Court should stay all proceedings that implicate liability to Plaintiffs for the posting of ad(s) 
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relating to them at Backpage.com, until the federal criminal case in U.S. v. Lacey implicating the 
operation and practices of the website reaches a final determination. 
Respectfully submitted, 
 
/s/ Robert Corn-Revere  
Robert Corn-Revere (pro hac vice) 
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ronnielondon@dwt.com 
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Washington, DC  20006 
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/s/ Dan Booth  
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